EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT MAO (12)

MAO: A LIFE by Philip Short, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2000. 782pp. [Part 12]
Reviewed by Thomas Riggins

This is an important work. Over the next few weeks I will be making entries one chapter at a time (there are sixteen). Comments are invited, especially from anyone who has read the book and wants to critique my take on a chapter, but anyone is welcome to comment.

Chapter 13 "The Sorcerer's Apprentice"

This chapter begins with Short telling us that "Economics were not Mao's strong point." This would lead to lots of problems. Short indicates that economic policies were based on political considerations. This looks a lot like Bush II and his view that he could make his own reality!

Short gives two examples. The New Democracy writings (capitalism encouraged, mixed economy, plus cooperatives and self-sufficiency for the Red Army) were predicated on the political needs of the united front and the struggle against Japan. Short points out that Mao insisted, in 1951's takeover of Tibet, that the Red Army produce its own food. The political motivation was not to provoke the Tibetans into rebellion.

Historically, the Chinese had come not to trust other countries and to be self-sufficient on the local and provincial levels as well as nationally. Mao realized his weakness in economic theory, as well as the CPC's, and Short quotes him as saying, on the eve of victory, "We shall have to master what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are ... We must acknowledge our ignorance, and not pretend to know what we do not know." Well, I take it back, this is completely unlike Bush II.

The Chinese turned to the Soviets for guidance, following the model of Five Year plans based on heavy industry. One big difference between Mao and Stalin , however, was in the collectivization of agriculture. Instead of forced collectivization of the peasants, Mao followed a program of a slower voluntary method. At least in the beginning.

In 1953 Mao thought socialism would be achieved by 1968 in the urban areas and by 1971 in the countryside. Happy optimist. Now the Chinese see it as sometime in the next century! Capitalists were still around in 1953. They had a role to play in the transition and were permitted to keep 25% of their profits.

Here, in the early period, the seeds of all the disruptions of the later years were sown, according to Short. In 1951 Bo Yibo (finance minister) and Liu Shaoqi were against rapid collectivization. Gao Gang (PB and in charge of Manchuria) argued for rapid collectivization (Mao agreed) to check what Gao called the "spontaneous tendency of the peasants towards capitalism."

Mao came out against Bo and "right-opportunist deviations" maintaining that "the question of the socialist road versus the capitalist road must be clarified." But what about the need for detours when the road becomes too rough and needs some repairs, or hasn't been laid down properly? What of the tension between objective reality and the desire for a quick transition to socialist institutions?

Mao also had too much power. He had been given the power "to overrule the rest of the Secretariat [of the PB]" back in 1943 as an emergency measure in the war with the GMD and against the Japanese. Now, after the revolution "he was arrogating to himself blanket authority over everything: his colleagues were allowed to do nothing without his explicit accord."

Collectivization problems developed in 1953. In the countryside the peasants were, as Short says, rushed into co-ops, the poor and the better off alike, socialism was seen as everyone "eating out of one big pot." The idea of sharing had not caught on. The well-off peasants killed their animals rather than share with the poor peasants [shades of Soviet collectivization!].

Then in 1954 floods ruined the summer harvest, food riots broke out (as the Party was still collecting the same quota as if nothing had happened). The riots woke Mao up. In January 1955 he instituted a two steps forward one step back policy which he called a "three-word scripture: 'Stop, contract, develop.'"

A few months later Mao and the CPC thought it was time to ramp up collectivization again. Mao thought "peasant resistance," Short writes, "had been overstated." The problem was, Short quotes Mao: "The peasants want freedom, but we want socialism."

An interesting quote, but Short makes it very difficult to check it out. He has zillions of footnotes and references (and no bibliography-- a shocking omission that devalues the usefulness of the book). This quote is sourced by "Teiwes and Sun, p. 42." The quote comes from their book on agriculture in China. But so what? Where did they get it from? Is it from an official record, gossip, someone's memoirs? Some of Short's "Mao quotes" have to be taken on faith. I think Short is an honest scholar, but his bourgeois perspective may induce him to accept as real "Mao quotes" some that come from less than 100% reliable sources. I will use [SW] if the quote comes from the Selected Works.

In any event, Deng Zihui (who was in charge of the collectivization efforts) thought it too soon to ramp up the movement again. He thought that Mao didn't think that all the material conditions for running such a big movement had to be in place before launching it. You launch a co-op movement with the peasants you have not the peasants you want.

By December 1956, 97% of the peasants were in collectives. Mao had pushed through the socialization of agriculture, originally planned to have been completed in 1971, way ahead of schedule. Would this be a Pyhrric victory? We shall see. We should note, however, this "success" had the consequence that "Mao, and other leaders" now believed that "given the will to succeed, material conditions need not be decisive." Is Bush II a Maoist?

Now it was time to get rid of the capitalists in the cities. The mixed economy, supposed to last into the 1960s, was to be replaced by "socialism." "Our aim," Mao said, "is to exterminate capitalism, obliterate it from the face of the earth and make it a thing of the past [SW]." Easier said than done. The China of today is, perhaps, the result of this rush to skip over historically necessary stages.

By January 1956 the private urban economy had been "converted to joint state-private ownership." Now even more advanced goals were to be achieved. As short says, "another gravity-defying leap forward" was in the making. Well, anyone can make a great leap but can they land where they want to.

1956 also saw Khrushchev's revelations of the crimes of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This not the place to rehash this, but I will go over how the Chinese reacted to the revelations. Mao was of two minds over the criticism of Stalin. In one sense, he said, it "destroyed myths, and opened boxes. This brings liberation ... [allowing people to] speak their minds and to be able to think about issues." But Stalin was not 100% wrong in all the things he did. He was "a great Marxist, [a] good and honest revolutionary" who had made some major mistakes.

An editorial in the People's Daily is quoted by Short: " Whatever the mistakes ... the dictatorship of the proletariat is, for the popular masses, always far superior to ... the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie ... Some people consider that Stalin was wrong in everything: this is a grave misconception ... We should view Stalin from an historical standpoint, make a proper and all-round analysis to see where he was right and where he was wrong and draw useful lessons therefrom. Both the things he did right and the things he did wrong were phenomena of the international communist movement and bore the imprint of the times."

The relationship of the USSR and China had changed. Mao now saw a relationship of equality developing. Khrushchev and the new leadership didn't have the star power of Stalin-- they were a "neophyte Soviet leadership." The problem was that the Soviets still treated the Chinese as second class communists and acted the "elder brother" to the CPC. This would bring, Short says, "Beijing and Moscow, before the decade was out, to the point of no return."

1956 also saw problems for the USSR in Poland and Hungary. There were riots in Poland and Wladyslaw Gomulka became the communist leader over the the objections of the Soviets. Worse, from their point of view, Imre Nagy became the leader in Hungary. The Chinese supported Poland because they thought each country had a right to develop communism in its own way. But when Hungary decided to leave the Warsaw Pack, the Chinese supported Russian intervention because they viewed Hungary as counterrevolutionary. "The mess the Soviet leaders had made in their own European backyard," Short writes, "further lowered them in Mao's estimation."

I hate giving big long quotes, but this is an important statement about the happenings of 1956 which Mao gave to the CPC Central Committee in November of that year. Hindsight is, as they say, 20/20, so we must ask if subsequent events prove Mao's analysis correct (not to say that he is not subject to an "et tu Mao?". Short quotes him as follows:

"I thinks there are two 'swords': one is Lenin and the other Stalin. The sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians ... We Chinese have not thrown it away. First we protect Stalin, and second, at the same time we criticize his mistakes ...

"As for the sword of Lenin, has it not also been discarded to a certain extent by some Soviet leaders? In my view, it has been discarded to a considerable extent. Is the October Revolution still valid? ... Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU says it is possible to seize state power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away ...

"How much capital do [the Russians] have? Just Lenin and Stalin. Now [they] have abandoned Stalin and practically all of Lenin as well-- with Lenin's feet gone, or perhaps with only his head left, or with one of his hands cut off. We on our part stick to studying Marxism-Leninism and learning from the October Revolution. [SW]" Where would one find those swords today in China?

In January 1957 Zhou Enlai visited Moscow. Short reports that four areas of disagreement became apparent between the Russians and the Chinese. They were:

1.) Over the role of Stalin. The Chinese thought he was 70% good and 30% bad. The Russians were much more negative. I note that this 70/30 split is how Mao is evaluated in the China of today.

2.) The Chinese rejected the "parliamentary road to socialism." One notes that as of 2007 the only countries in the world governed by communist parties are those in which revolutions took place. While not conclusive, it does suggest that the Chinese may have had a point. However, the Chinese were the first, almost, to say each party should be free to find its own path with respect to its own national conditions.

3.) The Chinese rejected the concept of "peaceful coexistence." The Chinese position was (People's Daily editorial)-- "The imperialists are always bent on destroying us. Therefore we must never forget ... class struggle on a world scale." Are Chinese policies today the product of amnesia or are they simply inscrutable?

4.) A philosophical problem! The Russians did not like Mao's use of the dialectical concept of "contradiction." Although contradiction was at the heart of the dialectical process, Stalin had rejected it and Soviet thinkers had avoided it [this was part of his 30% bad]. The Russians wanted one line for the world communist movement. The official announcement at the conclusions of the talks with Zhou read (with Russian insistence): "There have been are no essential contradictions ... in the relations between socialist states. Even if in the past there were shortcomings they are now being rectified and eliminated." Imry Nagy was certainly "eliminated."

The Chinese nevertheless still believed in contradictions. Short quotes a People's Daily editorial published only a month before Zhou's trip to Moscow. There are "contradictions in socialist countries between different sections of the people, between comrades within the Communist Party, [and] between the government and the people" and "contradictions between socialist countries, [and] contradictions between Communist Parties." The Russians and the Chinese were living in different worlds.

Another problem the CPC faced in the early 50s was how to handle "counterrevolutionary elements" inside the country. In a famous essay of 1957 by Mao "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" he argued that people should be free to criticize the party and that education and discussion should be used to defend the party's ideas not "crude methods." After all, as Short points out, there were 12 million proletarians in China vs. 550 million petty bourgeoisie (peasants, small traders,shopkeepers, students, etc.) There were bound to be a lot of confused and even hostile ideas.

This essay came in the middle of a campaign launched in 1956 that is known by the title "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." There were two reasons for this campaign. First, was a dearth of scientists, engineers and other creative thinkers which was holding up development. Mao didn't want to discourage new ideas that might help the revolution. Second, the anti-Stalin reaction in the USSR led the CPC to give up blindly following the Soviet model. Chinese intellectuals were to be free to experiment. At least that was Mao's intention at first.

Mao also thought that the reason for the disturbances in Eastern Europe was the fact that "bureaucratism" had led to a contradiction between the communist parties and the people. Also the parties had failed to get rid of the leftover counterrevolutionaries. Mao thought the counter- revolutionaries were under control in China but that bureaucratism and alienation from the masses were not under control. How could the party fulfill the wishes and needs of the masses if the masses feared to speak up?

So, Mao thought that "in China workers should be allowed to strike because 'this will be helpful in solving contradictions among the state, the factory directors and the masses', and students should be allowed to demonstrate. 'They are just contradictions, that's all. The world is full of contradictions.'" The 100 Flowers movement had two components or goals: making the party and the people closer and letting the people feel free to bring up their frustrations with the CPC.

Mao got a lot of flack from conservative elements in the party, especially from the PLA, over these ideas. The conservatives thought counter- revolutionary elements would make a comeback and run amuck. Mao rejected this criticism.

The intellectuals, however, were in no mood to trust Mao. They had been burned too many times before. And they were right. Mao really had two positions. People should speak up and be given the freedom to do so, but ultimately they must see their errors and come around to the views of the CPC.

"To Mao's dialectical mind." Short says, " these were just two sides of the same coin. 'In a unity of opposites,' he explained, 'there is always one aspect that is primary and another secondary.' The problem was, with Mao, which was which could change." The velvet glove was simply a better method than the stick. The Soviets knew only the stick and now they were having big problems in Eastern Europe. Their denial of contradiction would ultimately prove fatal.

The quotes from Mao, provided by Short, are positively democratic in spirit and any communist leader, even today, could stand behind them. "In the past we fought the enemy along with the people. Now, since the enemy is no longer there ... only the people and we remain. If they don't argue with us when they have grievances, who can they argue with? ... If we ... do not allow [this], our nation will be sapped of its vitality ... We must brace ourselves and let them ... The Communist Party has to let itself be scolded for a while." I believe if this had been the attitude in the USSR and Eastern Europe the Soviet block would still be in existence.

"The 'Hundred Flowers'," Short writes, "was the most ambitious attempt ever undertaken in any communist country [Cuba excepted, tr] to combine a totalitarian system with democratic checks and balances." It turned into a fiasco due to the paranoia of Mao and the CPC.

Mao was startled to find that many people were alienated from the party in the same manner as he said the people in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, in Poland had become. The gist of the complaints was that the CPC had become "a new bureaucratic class which monopolised power and privilege and had alienated itself from the masses." It was not the "masses", however, making the criticisms. It was mostly the intellectuals and better educated.

Mao changed from seeing blooming flowers, as Short notes, to seeing noxious weeds. The CPC now thought a Rightist counterrevolution must be at work and that a purge was needed. In the end 520,000 people were sent off to prison and labor camps. These people were being punished "solely for their ideas." The victims were "hundreds of thousands of loyal citizens who had taken the Party at its word."

Short says it was a "tragedy" because Mao really "did want the intellectuals to 'think for themselves.'" He really wanted, in his own words, "the creation of a political environment where there will be both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of purpose and personal ease of mind and liveliness."

The problem was that Mao was so sure of his thought and way of viewing Marxism that he could not believe, after people were given such a great amount of freedom, that they would not end up agreeing with the party. If they didn't it must be for sinister reasons.

At least there was no physical violence and shootings. Mao wanted to overcome those extremes from the days before the CPC had state power. After the fact he realized he had over reacted to the 'Hundred Flowers' and said he was "confused by false appearances." But the damage was done. "The very people whom Mao needed most to build the strong, new China he had been dreaming of since his youth had been definitively alienated."

After the failure of the 'Hundred Flowers', Short reports that Mao reverted to the idea of mass mobilization as the way to advance, and this gave rise to the "Little Leap Forward" in early 1956. The Little Leap failed because the targets were set too high. Mao had to retrench, but in the fall of 1957 he was ready to try again.

Mao decided that economics should take a backrest to politics. This was a big mistake and very un-Marxist as it meant taking a formation in the superstructure as more primary that what was going on in the base. This was actually a form of Idealism.

This was a time of unbridled optimism. The Russians were saying that they would overtake the US in fifteen years [fat chance] and Mao proclaimed that "I think we can [say] that we have left the Western world behind us ... I say that we have left them behind us once and for all."

In January of 1958 Mao put forth the theory of "uninterrupted revolution." He thought, according to Short, that socialism was already constructed in China ["collectivisation of the means of production"] and now it was time for a political, ideological and technological leap forward. Unfortunately, Mao's idealism came to the fore. He said "When we study a problem we must subdue the [facts] by [adopting] a viewpoint, and activate the affair at hand with politics." This is a little too much like Bush 2's people saying we can make our own reality!

It was on this basis that the Great Leap Forward was officially launched in 1958. Short points out that modern science, as understood in the West, had no tradition in China and was a recent import. And Mao "freely admitted" he did not know anything about it or about modern technology based upon it. He had a triumph of the will attitude. "In a country," Short says, "with a tradition of scientific and industrial expertise, the targets advanced in the Great Leap would have been dismissed as the idle dreams they were."

But a people, a nation, has to learn by doing. The risk for Marxism in China is, too many non or un-Marxist attempts to skip stages and leap into the "communist" future could lead to a disbelief in Marxism itself because of the failures of its incorrect applications.

Short quotes an article Mao wrote two years before the Great Leap Forward to show his mental state at the time. "China's 600 million people have two remarkable peculiarities; they are, first of all, poor, and secondly blank. That may seem like a bad thing, but it is really a good thing. Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no blotches, and so the newest and most beautiful words can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful pictures can be painted on it."

Short calls this hubris, thinking 600 million people could be molded "like putty." He is not far wrong, I fear, and as he points out, catastrophe "was not long in coming."

Meanwhile relations with the Russians were turning sour. In 1957 Khrushchev offered to help the Chinese develop nuclear weapons and even to give them "a sample atom bomb." However, Mao's attitude towards nuclear war was not reassuring. In case of such a war he speculated that even if half of humanity was destroyed the half that was left would beat imperialism "and the whole world would become socialist." Not a very politic speculation.

Mao made these comments at the Conference of World Communist Parties (Moscow, November 1957) attended by representatives from over 60 countries. Short says the Soviets began to have second thoughts about giving Mao the bomb. But, he says, "the technology agreement had been signed."

Another big problem was that the Chinese were still only a few years away from their revolutionary victory and were still hot to press on with world revolutionary activities against US imperialism and its allies. The Russians were trying to prevent nuclear war and promote peaceful coexistence under the impression socialist economic development would eventually out strip the West. To Mao, Short writes, "this was a betrayal of the international communist movement and the revolutionary cause it was pledged to promote." Nevertheless, outward amity was maintained. The world was as yet unaware of the deepening fissure.

By 1959 problems with the Great Leap Forward were impossible to ignore. The grain harvest was faltering. The Chinese peasants had been building backyard furnaces to make pig iron for steel to overtake the West. This movement was forsaken as most of the product was worthless. The peasants resented being pushed too much and found life in the communes too restrictive. Mao had to admit, "Just as a child plays with fire ... and knows pain only when it is burnt so, in economic construction, we declared war on nature, like an inexperienced child, unfamiliar with strategy and tactics." Well, live and learn.

In 1959 Khrushchev also told Mao that the Soviets were going to renege on the nuclear agreement. No bomb for Mao. Later that year he went to Beijing for the 10th Anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic. It was also to make a last ditch effort to patch up the alliance.

He did not succeed. The Chinese thought the Russians put their own national interests first and the interests of the world communist movement second. They certainly didn't seem to care about the national desires of their Chinese comrades. Khrushchev felt the same about the Chinese. This was a clash of civilizations! "The basis," Short says, "for a fraternal relationship simply no longer existed." World imperialism, led by the U.S., could only cheer.

The split became more public in 1960. The Russians pushed peaceful coexistence, the Chinese rejected it. "As long as imperialism existed," Shorts says the People's Daily editorialized in April (Lenin's 90th birthday), "wars would occur; peaceful competition was a fraud, perpetrated by 'the old revisionists and their modern counterparts.'" Khrushchev for his part called Mao "an ultra-Leftist, an ultra-dogmatist and a left revisionist." So take that!

The Russians then withdrew all their aid from the Chinese, and took out all their technical experts so that "Factories were left half-built; blueprints torn up [really vile, so the Chinese could not help themselves on their own]; [and]research projects abandoned." This was really hostile and uncalled for on the part of the Soviets.

This was particularly bad timing as the Great Leap Forward was tanking and natural disasters were piling up on the Chinese. The Russians, Short writes, "inflicted enormous economic damage at a time when China was least able to deal with it." Meanwhile more than one third of China's cultivated land was suffering under "the worst drought for a century." Then floods wiped out half as much again of cultivated land. About half of the cultivated land was out of service. Nature and the Great Leap together brought about famine. "It was the worst human disaster ever to befall China." There was cannibalism and the peasants swapped children before eating them-- "to avoid eating their own."

Between 1959 and 1961 25 million people, according to Short, starved to death, a little over 4% of the population. Short says it was the worst ever, but the Taiping Rebellion does seem to have been worst in terms of the percentage of people killed. and if the natural disasters are taken into account, the Great Leap Forward runs neck to neck with the great 1870 famine under the Qing Dynasty. At any rate the CPC policies were off the wall and shows what can happen when you ignore science and think that political will power can substitute for economic reality.

A costly lesson indeed. Mao, short says, "set aside once and for all the idea of making China a great economic power, never to concern himself with it again."

[from PAEditorsBlog]

SEYMOUR HERSH ON BUSH’S PLAN FOR IRAN

by Thomas Riggins

Seymour Hersh is back with another New Yorker article (“Shifting Targets: The Administration’s plan for Iran,” issue of October 8, 2007). It seems that the Iran plan has changed a bit since his last article, six or seven months ago,appeared.[An article about it is in the blog archives] Hersh isn’t sure that Iran will be attacked, but there is certainly a hugh military build up taking place. Since there is no real evidence that Iran is making the Bomb, the new rationale for attack is that Iran is attacking us!

Here is a quote from Bush in August of this year: “Shia extremists, backed by Iran, are training Iraqis to carry out attacks on our forces and the Iraqi people ... I have authorized our military commanders in Iraq to confront Tehran’s murderous activities.”

Hersh’s article makes it clear that Bush is just fabricating these charges to con the American people into supporting his policies. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki (who is kept in power by American troops) has given the lie to Bush’s allegations by stating that Iranian and Iraqi relations were “improved to the point that they are not interfering in our internal affairs.” It seems its only Bush who is interfering in Iraq’s “internal affairs” [leaving the war out of account] by, for instance, keeping the really murderous Blackwater mercenaries in theatre and paying off this ultra-right Republican corporation will millions in tax payer money.

The President’s supporters can only try to build support for his policies by the most outlandish and even stupid arguments. Norman Podhoretz, a notorious right wing hack who is always given media coverage, is quoted by Hersh as writing that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is “like Hitler ... whose objective is to overturn the going international system and to replace it ... with a new order dominated by Iran.” Podhoretz thinks we must attack Iran, and, he gets to meet with Bush!

Now, granted that Iran is not the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, but the idea that Iran is out to dominate the world is so ridiculous that Podhoretz has only succeeded in making a fool out of himself. Unfortunately, it appears that he has the ear of another fool as Hersh quotes him as saying “Bush is going to hit” Iran. As I said, Hersh isn’t sure about this. He writes, “I was repeatedly cautioned, in interviews, that the President has yet to issue the ‘execute order’ that would be required for a military operation inside Iran, and such an order may never be issued.” Lets hope Bush keeps his head.

By the way, this article throws some light on the Gen. Petraeus “Betray Us”
flap. If the general lies to the Congress to create a pretext for attacking Iran, then “Betray Us” or “Betray U.S.” would be an appropriate nickname.
Well, here is what he told Congress. Hersh quotes him as saying Iran is waging “a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.”
But we saw above that the leader of the Iraqi state says that Iran is not interfering in Iraq. Petraeus out and out lied to the Congress and the American people. He should be stripped of his stars and dishonorably discharged before his actions cause the death of more American soldiers and Iraqi civilians.

This article points out that all the main charges against Iran that Bush is harping about (and that his tin pot general mostly repeats)-- trying to get the Bomb, supplying the “enemy” with weapons, and sending agents into the country are all dubious and unproved.

Hersh gives three reasons for the shift away from emphasis on Iran's nuclear ambitions to its providing weapons to the insurgents fighting the U.S. 1.) the American people are not buying the nuclear threat hype, 2.) our intelligence agencies insist that Iran is at least 5 years away from making a bomb [if that is what they are up to], 3.) it seems "that Iran is emerging as the geopolitical winner of the war in Iraq." It seems to me that this last reason is the biggest reason motivating Bush and his supporters.

Hersh points out that "The crux of the Bush Administration's strategic dilemma is that its decision to back a Shiite-led government after the fall of Saddam has empowered Iran, and made it impossible to exclude Iran from the Iraqi political scene."

It was the decision to invade and occupy Iraq in the first place, I think, that was flawed That decision was made by people profoundly ignorant of the history and the nature of the countries and peoples of the region. It was also made by people who are arrogant and have not even learned from our own history. Ignorance and arrogance go together. President Bush should check out Proverbs 16:18. As we all know, after Korea, Gen. MacArthur reputedly said the US should never get involved in a land war in Asia. Then followed the disaster in Vietnam and now Iraq.

One of Hersh"s sources tells him one reason Bush is bogged down and losing in Iraq is his failure to do the things that could help him succeed, such as engaging positively with Syria and Iran (as was proposed by the Iraq Study Group). Another points out that the type of bombing plan the Pentagon would engage in, if ordered by Bush, can't work without good intelligence on which targets to hit. The U.S. has no such reliable intelligence. Attacking Iran will further complicate the situation for the U.S. in Iraq and just make a bigger mess for whomever has to clean up after Bush is out of office.

Everyone should try to get a copy of Hersh's article to read. I have only presented a few of its high lights. The article itself gives ample evidence that the case against Iran is very weak and mostly contrived. Pressure has to be increased on the Congress to try and rein Bush and his generals in before they can create an even bigger catastrophe in the Middle East. Congress can stop them, it simply lacks the courage and will to do so. So the people must apply the pressure to shore up our so-called representatives. Congress should go on record now that Iran cannot be attacked without its explicit consent. The war powers must be taken back and reside in the Congress as intended by the Founders.

[originally from Political Affairs on-line]

HOW NOT TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS

Thomas Riggins

Who doesn't remember the scandalous murders of 17 "apparently unarmed Iraqis" [New York Times 10-05-07] in Haditha two years ago by American marines run amok? The "apparently unarmed" civilians include at least seven "apparently unarmed" women and children. Now the military is investigating itself. ["Investigator Said to Find Case Against Marine Weak" by Paul von Zielbauer, ibid.]

The military investigator assigned to the case has been recommending that murder charges be dismissed against the troops he has been assigned to investigate. One of the reasons the case is "weak", according to the New York Times is "that murder charges against marines could harm the morale of troops still in Iraq."

By that logic no murder charges should ever be brought against rogue elements in the military. Not only that, but this reasoning could lead to an increase in illegal killings as the troops get the message that they will not be held accountable for murder.

This will also increase resentment against the troops and lead to more American casualties. Lets just get the troops out ASAP and put an end to Bush's cowboy war fantasies.
from PAEditorsBlog

Why Can't They Just Say It?

Headlines, the New York Times 10-4-07 "Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations."
Why can't 'The newspaper of record' just put it out there: "Secret U.S. Endorsement of Torture."
If we beat around the Bush we will end up never finding out the truth. Oh, I forgot, the Mets lost.
[Thomas Riggins, from PA Editors Blog]

JOKE OF THE WEEK

Thomas Riggins

11 Long term health insurance companies, including the three biggest [Genworth Financial, Conseco, and Penn Treaty), have been asked by Congress why so many policies of the elderly are being "mishandled."

According to the New York Times there are procedures "that make it difficult, if not impossible, for some policy holders to be paid." Some people suspect that the companies are more interested in profit than in the well being of the policy holders. It has even been claimed that the companies have no intention of honoring their health policies, they only want the money and deliberately reject claims on bogus charges.

Complaints by the elderly have risen 92% in the last six years, and when independently reviewed the majority of claim denials have been overturned and the companies had to pay.

"This is a pattern of ERROR not typically found in other lines of health- related insurance" according to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The joke is the use of the word "Error". There is no "error", in my opinion, but a deliberate abuse of the elderly to make them suffer and die so the companies can make big bucks. But that's the free market for you.

THE FISHERS OF MEN: OFFICERS VS PSYCHOPATHS

by Thomas Riggins

One of the best arguments for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq can be based on our own self-interests. The fact that we are murdering and killing Iraqis and destroying their country and culture does not seem to impress the political class in the US. Only a few Congress people even seem to be aware of it. The way the Senate stumbled over itself in defending Gen. Betrayus is a case in point.

So here is an argument calculated to appeal to our own self-interest. We want to have an army we can depend upon and an officer corps we can respect. The Iraq war shows we have neither. This is fairly well known to those who have been following the war and know the type of men and women who are willing to serve as officers under Bush. Not only do they care more about advancing their careers than their duty, but they use the regular troops, the grunts and GIs, as pawns for their career advancement, even turning them into common murderers when it suits their purposes.

I am in no way disparaging the common soldiers and national guard troops, but the officer corps is, I think, totally corrupt from Betrayus on down and needs to be purged in conjunction with the impeachment of Bush and Cheney.

I submit as evidence the following article from the New York Times of 9-28-07 which shows in microcosm what is happening in a larger scale throughout the military, namely, officers ordering and pressuring the troops to kill noncombatants, then covering up for themselves and holding the soldiers responsible for the misdeeds. The article, by Paul von Zielbauer, is entitled “Testimony in Court-Martial Describes a Sniper Squad Pressed to Raise Body Counts.”

According to the NYT, Army Field Manual 23-10 says that “A sniper must not be susceptible to emotions such as anxiety or remorse.” The sniper is also taught to “calmly and deliberately” kill people including people who are not threatening him. These are also the characteristics of a socio-pathic serial killer, so what type of training has the military cooked up that we don’t know about? The snipers are going to be under a lot of pressure because human beings (excepting psychopaths and sociopaths) cannot be made immune to the emotions of anxiety and remorse.

There was a court-martial in Iraq last week of a sniper accused of killing innocent Iraqis (he was found not guilty of murder but of planting evidence -- most likely following orders). The following information came out in the proceedings. Snipers testified they "were pushed beyond limits by battalion commanders eager to raise their kill ratio against a ruthless enemy." Of course, both sides are "ruthless" with respect to one another. But "eager to raise their kill ratios" should tell you the army will be killing a lot of civilians to get these ratios up so the officers can look good to their superiors.

The article notes that at a separate hearing in July a soldier testified that snipers sensed "an underlying tone" of, as the Times reports, "disappointment from field commanders seeking higher enemy body counts." The soldier said, with respect to not killing enough people, "It just kind of felt like, 'What are you guys doing wrong out there?'". The troops are trying to do their jobs-- engage the enemy. The officers don't want that-- they just want bodies.

This is Catch 22. The insurgency is supposed to be going down, so there should be less insurgents around to kill, but the officers reputations, in their minds (and in the 'kill 'em all' culture of the Pentagon), depend on killing more people. What to do?

How are they going to look good by killing more people if there are less bad guys around? A simple solution. They can entrap innocent civilians, kill them, get credit for being outstanding officers, and blame the grunts if something goes wrong. Some day they may even get four stars! Why the Senate may even pass resolutions condemning American citizens for questioning and disrespecting their military overlords.

Here is what the battalion commanders decided to do. They would plant "bait" consisting of "fake explosives and detonation wires" around an area [of course they knew curious civilians and poor people scavenging for scrap would be lured towards this bait] then anyone picking up the bait could be killed and the US Army would get the credit (the officers involved, that is) for killing "the enemy." We have already been told that "real" insurgents don't depend on scraps to make their explosives, they come ready made from Iran. It seems whole countries can be set up just as easily as poor Iraqis.

The officers also "sought less restrictive rules of engagement--- to legalize the combat killing of anyone who made a soldier 'feel threatened' [i.e., any Iraqi from 8 to 80], for example, instead of showing intent or actions...." This shows that killing for the sake of killing was the goal of the officers, not anything remotely related to "legitimate" warfare. Well, not just for the sake of killing, but to make the officers look good an extra ribbon or two for all that blood couldn't hurt your career prospects. How many careers were made by killing Vietnamese peasants , how many war heroes were made by bombing people from 50,000 feet. Why can't Iraqi workers and peasants blood serve the same purpose? What better way to live up to Duty, Honor, Country?

Now that this is out in the open we can expect the blame to fall on this or that rogue GI, the officers will circle the wagons, the war will go on, new techniques of baiting and fishing for men will be devised, and exposed, until this criminal war is brought to an end. Its going to be up to the American people to do this as quickly as possible and not wait for the Iraqis to drive us out. There has been too much blood shed already, the blood of our troops and the Iraqis, too much blood shed for oil and the career goals of thugs with stars and eagles on their shoulders.

Thomas Riggins is the book review editor of Political Affairs and can be reached at pabooks@politicalaffairs.net

EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT MAO (11)

MAO: A LIFE by Philip Short, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2000. 782pp. [Part 11]
Reviewed by Thomas Riggins

This is an important work and the editor's blog is a good place to discuss it as a preliminary to a review article for PA. Over the next few weeks I will be making entries one chapter at a time (there are sixteen). Comments are invited, especially from anyone who has read the book and wants to critique my take on a chapter, but anyone is welcome to comment.

Chapter 12 "Paper Tigers"

For the first six months after the civil war resumed at the end of WW II the GMD made advances, but by 1949 the GMD had to abandon China proper and retreat to Taiwan. The beginning of this chapter describes the military and social factors that led to this massive GMD defeat. Basically the People's Liberation Army (PLA)-- the new name for the Red Army, won due to the incompetence of the GMD officers, including Chiang, the cruelty of their recruitment methods (forced impressment of soldiers) and the worthlessness of their cause (the maintenance of class oppression of the peasants who made up 90% of the population).

Chiang had more troops and he was being supported with money and material by the US (ever the friend of fascist dictators and against the popular masses) and yet he lost. Short says "Mao relied on the 'collective will of the masses', And that "was more than enough."

At this time Mao made his "paper tigers" comment. "All reactionaries are paper tigers." This isn't the case that the tigers don't have claws. It is because the masses ultimately determine history. The desire for freedom and human emancipation are stronger than the weapons of the repressors. Hitler and Johnson were paper tigers in this respect, and Bush too is one.

Mao underestimated the power of the A bomb-- he called it "a paper tiger" because people not weapons decide "the outcome of a war." But a weapon than can destroy humanity deserves a little more respect. But no sensible tiger would attack an animal that it knows will also kill it.

On October 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. It was to be 'a people's democratic dictatorship.' How, you might ask, can there be such a thing as a "democratic dictatorship"? Is this not a contradiction? How can the same thing be a gas and a solid (water)? Without an understanding of dialectics, especially the unity of opposites, it is difficult to understand. Lenin's "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a democratic measure causes similar confusions.

Short quotes from Mao's 1949 "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship":
"[The reactionaries say:] 'You are dictatorial.' Dear Sirs, you are right, that is exactly what we are ... Only the people are allowed the right to voice their opinions. Who are 'the people'? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the ... Communist Party, these classes unite together to ... carry out a dictatorship over the lackeys of imperialism -- the landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class and the GMD reactionaries and their henchmen -- to suppress them and [ensure] they behave properly ... The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people ... The right to vote is given only to the people and not to the reactionaries. These two aspects, namely democracy among the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, combine to form the people's democratic dictatorship."

Progressives should meditate on these words. Is the CPC today acting in their spirit? Did the implosion of the Soviet Union result from the failure of the CPSU to properly carry out the democratic system "within the ranks of the people?" Mao also said, "We should be capable not only of destroying the old world. We must also be capable of creating the new." Aye, there's the rub.

In late December 1949 thru the middle of February 1950 Mao visited with Stalin in Moscow. On Valentines Day a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" was signed between the two communist powers. The future of the world communist movement would depend, on whether this was a binding commitment or a pie crust.

Was there sincerity and mutual respect between the two leaders? There seems to have been on Mao's side at the time. But Short writes that "Stalin, for his part, remained convinced that Mao was an ersatz communist, a Chinese version of the nineteenth century Russian peasant leader, Pugachev." In 1958 Mao said in a speech, "He mistrusted us. He thought our revolution was a fake."

Fake or not, the Soviets and Chinese would be forced to rely upon each other when, a few months after Mao's return from Moscow the Korean War began (25 June 1950). Mao knew it was coming as Stalin had given his ok to Kim Il Sung to reunite Korea by force IF the Chinese approved.
Six weeks before the war Kim had told this to Mao. Short says the Chinese were not all that supportive as they were planning to invade Taiwan and this Korean adventure would disrupt their own plans for unifying their country. Since, as Short points out, 100,000 Koreans had fought with the Chinese in Manchuria, how could China refuse to support their efforts to kick out the imperialists occupying the south of Korea, especially after Stalin had agreed to the plan. China, as Short puts it "acquiesced."

This is not the place to discuss all the intrigues around the Korean war and the aftermath of the invasion. Suffice to say that things began to go badly for the Koreans after the American intervention (under the fig leaf
of the UN), Stalin reneged on his promise to provide air support to the Koreans (he didn't want a confrontation with the US), and China was left holding the bag and had to bail the Koreans out by a military intervention.

Meanwhile, the CPC was trying to bring about land reform in the countryside to improve the lot of poor peasants. It met fierce resistance from the landlord class. In 1950, 3000 party workers were killed in the rural areas. Mao unleashed the peasants against the landlords. Within six months 710,000 people (most linked to the GMD) "were executed or driven to suicide." Another 1,500,000 were sent to "reform through labour"
camps. We must remember that the GMD acted exactly the same way when it controlled areas (except they didn't set up camps, they just shot you).

Mao differed from Stalin in the way the landlord class was eliminated. Stalin had used the state security organs (this terrorized both sides), but Mao let the peasants loose to attack and judge their own oppressors. Throughout China the people themselves took action against the exploiters. When land reform was completed in 1952 1 to 3 million members of the landlord class (no one knows for sure) had been killed.
That kind of class hatred is hard for Americans to imagine. The nearest I can think of is how Nat Turner felt about his oppressors, or how the Haitian slaves acted in their independence struggle against the French planters.

At any rate, "the landlords as a cohesive class, which had dominated rural society since Han times [i.e., for over 2000 years], had simply ceased to exist." The Revolution, the overthrow and abolishing of one class by another, was not a fake."

Next the cities had to be purged: " 'to cleanse our society', as Mao put it, 'of all the filth and poison left over from the old regime.' " Short lists the three big campaigns that Mao devised:

1. The Three Antis (against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism [they need another one of these]).

2. The Five Antis (against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, embezzlement, and revealing of 'state secrets' [they could redo at least four these also]).

3. A "thought reform movement' was also launched to rid the intellectuals of ractionary ideas.

Short doesn't approve of any of these movements, but they were perhaps inevitable given the horrid treatment of ordinary peasants and working people by the ancien regime, the threat posed by GMD elements still loyal to Chiang on Taiwan, and the Korean War raging. Now, 1952, Mao declared, Short writes, "The bourgeoisie ... was no longer to be regarded as an ally of the proletariat." There has been some backsliding of late in this regard.

By 1953, with the truce in the war, China was unified (except for Tibet and Taiwan) behind the CPC, and, as Short says, the war [and, I would add the three campaigns, again carried out by the masses not the security apparatus] had "produced a sense of regeneration and national pride which forced grudging respect even among those who otherwise had little sympathy for the new regime." And, forcing the Americans back across the 38th parallel and retaking the North from them before halting (they could have forced them out of Korea entirely but the cost was deemed too great), showed, for the first time, that the US was a paper tiger.

from PAEditorsBlog

NAOMI KLEIN ON "DISASTER CAPITALISM"

By Thomas Riggins

This article is a review of Naomi Klein’s important article in the October 2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine (“Disaster Capitalism: The new economy of catastrophe”) based on her new book, The Shock Doctrine.

A major theme in this article is the analogy between the effects of war and of “natural” disasters on people and the environment. The contrast between the Green Zone in Iraq (a safe haven) and the Red Zone (the rest of Iraq) is analogized with the aftermath of Katrina and the difference between the areas of New Orleans inhabited by the rich (reconstructed and prospering) and the poor (neglected and festering).

Just as areas of Iraq outside the Green Zone have been destroyed and the people brutalized by Bush’s war, so have many areas throughout the world faced the same type of treatment and the people have seen their regions “demolished by ideology, the war on ‘big government’, the religion of tax cuts, [and] the fetish for privatization.”

In many areas of the Third World infrastructure (what little there is) is failing under the assault of the philosophy of “free trade.” Klein gives as an example the failure of the sewer system in Jakarta (capital of Indonesia). Earlier this year, 57 people died and half the city was inundated by raw sewage. This was due to policies that cut back on public investment and social spending in order to enrich the private sector.

The same is happening here in the US. The bridge collapse in Minneapolis, the subway flooding in New York, all due to the neglect of the public sphere so that tax cuts and incentives can be dished out to the private sector. Klein points out that The American Society of Civil Engineers states that the US public infrastructure (“roads, bridges, schools, dams”) has been neglected to such an extent that it would five years and 1.5 trillion dollars just to get it back up to standard.

This is the background for the development of “disaster capitalism.” Ms Klein writes: “Every time a new crisis hits-- even when the crisis itself is the direct by-product of free-market ideology-- the fear and disorientation that follow are harnessed for radical social and economic re-engineering.” That is to say, the ruling class is using disasters, both natural and those brought about by their polices, to ram through social structural changes in their interests that they never could have brought about using the democratic process. Getting rid of public housing for the poor in New Orleans, for example.

What is happening is that private corporations are rushing to take over the role of disaster relief and reconstruction and make super profits as a result. They are aided and abetted by those politicians who push the ideology of free market capitalism and slam as “socialism” any measures by the public sector to solve social problems. It is quite instructive, in this regard, to compare Alan Greenspan’s rapturous description of the wonders of the free market in his book The Age of Turbulence, with what Naomi Klein has found on the ground in her travels around the world.

Klein sees the development of disaster capitalism as an evolution and extension of the older concept of “the industrial-mililtary complex” that President Eisenhower spoke of back in 1961 [originally “the industrial-military-congressional complex” because Ike knew the US Congress was a completely corrupt and complicit equal component of this complex -- as it still is-- but he allowed his speech writers to delete “congressional” to keep the illusions of bourgeois democracy alive for that fraction of the population that still voted].

This new "disaster-capitalism complex" she describes as one "in which all conflict - and disaster - related functions (waging war, securing borders, spying on citizens, rebuilding cities, treating traumatized soldiers) can be performed by corporations at a profit."

What has happened is that a state within a state has been created-- a virtual corporate run state that now carries out many of the functions that the state represented by the US government used to perform. The Bush administration, for example, gave out 3.4 billion dollars in no bid contracts to its corporate buddies to rebuild after Katrina. E.g., Blackwater provides guards for FEMA operations for $950 a day per guard!

Its all our tax payer money that goes to fund these corporate crooks. The "shadow state," Klein writes, "has been built almost exclusively with public resources... and is all privately owned and controlled." This is how the famous free market works-- it simply loots the public sector for its profits.

This new disaster capitalist market now, Klein says, has to be protected. That means NGOs, charities, and government entities are seen as potential enemies and rivals by the new corporate state. For example the mercenary providers, firms such as Blackwater, are looking for bigger and better contracts. They now say "they are better equipped than the UN to engage in peacekeeping in Darfur." Just give them a big for profit contract and the African Union troops can stay home.

And it is not just Darfur. Klein quotes a Lockheed Martin representative about the contracting out of the police and fire departments of American towns and cities to private firms: "What they do for the military in downtown Fallujah [leave it as a pile of rubble?--TR] they can do for the police in downtown Reno."

And if this isn't bad enough, Klein gives us a quote from Fast Company magazine on the results of the "War on Terror" [the unleashing of the US military as a result of the fluke 9/11 attack]. The "end result" will be "a new more resilient approach to national security, one built not around the state but around private citizens and companies .... Security will become a function of where you live and whom you work for, much as health care is allocated already."

This is another major theme of Klein's article. That the country is turning into a domestic copy of the Iraqi Green Zone. There will be gated and protected areas with state of the art schools, hospitals, police and fire protection, nice housing, etc. areas walled off from the rest of the common lower class herd of Americans, and all run by private companies.

We can see this trend in New Orleans today, Klein writes. Gated communities for the well off (mostly white) protected by private security forces, and FEMA villages: "desolate, out-of-the-way trailer camps for low-income evacuees, built by Bechtel or Fluor subcontractors and administered by private security companies that patrolled the gravel lots, restricted visitors, kept journalists out, and treated survivors like criminals."

An ominous new factor to note is, that heretofore terrorist attacks and national disasters used to send the stock market down. Now they make it jump up. The new disaster capitalists stand to make fortunes out of the human misery of these disasters now that the government just turns over no bid contracts for them to do the follow up. And they don't even have to do the work. There is little or no supervision or accountability. Any problems with poor results are explained away by the corporations and taken at face value by the Bush administration.

What used to be a "truism" of capitalist dogma, Klein says, is no longer so: namely, "that you couldn't have booming economic growth in the midst of violence and instability." At least for some parts of the economy and for the biggest corporations in the stocks representing aerospace, defense and homeland security, and, of course oil and gas just the opposite is the case. "The oil and gas industry," Klein says, "is so intimately entwined with the economy of disaster -- both as a root cause behind many disasters and as beneficiary from them -- that it deserves to be treated as an honorary adjunct of the disaster-capitalism complex."

It is important to note the relationship between the disaster capitalists and, Klein points out, "elite opinion makers." Not only do they have many members of Congress in their pockets (from both parties), but also many areas of the mass media is under their control and they fund "think tanks" to churn out propaganda in their interests (especially the National Institute for Public Policy and the Center for Security Policy).

So, Daddy Warbucks is alive and well. We can expect the US, I think, to bomb Iran for no other reason than to have an excuse to spend public money on corporations to sell the government the bombs and other weapons. Wars and disasters are ends in themselves-- an excuse to enrich the industrial- military complex [AKA disaster capitalism].

Wouldn't it be interesting if the Bushites were in Iraq not to "win" but simply to destroy as much as they could of both our own resources, human and material, and the Iraqi's, just so they could justify the transfer of billions, if not trillions, of dollars from the public funds of the US to the corporate allies of the Bush administration.

After all many, if not most, of the Pentagon big shots, after retirement, end up making real money on the boards of disaster capitalist companies. In any case, Iraq is a "win win" situation. Win, and you get the oil. Lose and you get to enrich the corporations anyway by all the expenditures. And, if Exxon can't have the oil, selling it for $80 a barrel is a good consolation.

EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT MAO (10)

MAO: A LIFE by Philip Short, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2000. 782pp. [Part 10]
Reviewed by Thomas Riggins

This is an important work. Over the next few weeks I will be making entries one chapter at a time (there are sixteen). Comments are invited, especially from anyone who has read the book and wants to critique my take on a chapter, but anyone is welcome to comment.

Chapter 11 "Yan'an Interlude: the Philosopher is King"

In the summer of 1937 the leadership of the CPC had settled down in its new HQ at Yan'an in Shensi province. Here it would remain for the next ten years. Short tells us that "the myth of 'the Yan'an Way'" [i.e., the type of communist theory that Mao developed there] along with the Long March would become "one of the most enduring emblems of the system [Mao] was to create." He had two major tasks, according to Short. First, he had to build up his power as a leader and, second, he had to develop his own version of Marxist thought, or least put his "personal stamp" on Marxist theory.

There doesn't seem to be anything objectionable in Mao's theoretical work at this time, as reported by Short. Back in 1925 "he had called for 'an ideology produced in Chinese conditions'." This appears to be a reasonable demand. In 1935, at Wayaobu he got the PB to support a flexible sort of Marxism to be applied "to 'specific, concrete Chinese conditions', and condemned 'leftist dogmatism', meaning slavish adherence to Moscow's ideas." Again, this seems quite sound.

In early 1936 he maintained the CPC ought to, in his words, "run things by itself, and have faith in its own abilities." Short writes that he declared "Soviet and Chinese policies coincided... 'only where the interests of the Chinese masses coincide with the interests of the Russian masses.'" There should not, I think, be a contradiction between the two interests.

Later in the Fall of 1936 in "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," he maintained that mechanically copying the Soviet experience ("cutting the feet to fit the shoes") would lead to defeat. Short says Mao, by "affirming the primacy of indigenous experience" was "consciously laying the groundwork for the idea of Marxism in a national form." Even so, dialectics should tell us that there is no necessary contradiction between internationalism and nationalism within the communist movement.

Short gives Mao credit for breaking "new ground" by "arguing that the particular and the general were 'interconnected and inseparable', which later provided a theoretical basis for contending that general Marxist principles must always exist in a particular national form."

At this time his two famous essays "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" were also written. "On Practice" can be "summed up in the aphorism, 'Practice is the criterion of truth'." This is nothing new, it goes back to Engels at least.

In "On Contradiction" he argued "it was necessary in any given situation to determine what was the principal contradiction, and which was its principal aspect." [In practice this has proved very difficult to do!]

Short thinks that Mao "cut loose from Stalinist orthodoxy" when he maintained that the superstructure can independently also react on the economic base and the productive forces and is not totally determined by them. Mao said, "In general, the material determines the mental. [But] we also, and indeed must, recognize the operation of mental on material things." But this is perfectly orthodox and can be found in Marx and Engels, especially in some of their letters.

1937 wasn't just spent on philosophy. Political and military battles were also being fought. Wang Ming, the Soviet trained leader, was pushing Stalin's line that the Japanese must be opposed by CPC unity with the GMD. Mao's view was that cooperation was possible without co-optation but Wang and other Soviet trained members of the PB were not concerned with the problem of co-optation. They seemed to favor unity at any cost.

Meanwhile the Japanese invasion continued unabated. Mao now wrote two works (1938) that have become classics. He argued in his "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War' that when a small powerful nation attacks a weak large one, then most of the territory of the weak nation will be overrun. This was the case with Japan and China.

Just the opposite is happening in Iraq. There a powerful large nation has invaded a weak little nation (a specialty of the US military which only seems able to win against countries the size of Panama or smaller) but it controls almost nothing outside of the Green Zone, a few streets, sometimes, in Baghdad and some out lying sparsely populated areas. It is, in fact, bogged down.

This can be explained by the theory put forth by Mao in his second work: "On Protracted War" in which he said the fight against the invader would be long and difficult but, as Short put it, Mao thought the "people's determination to fight for their homes, their culture and their land would ultimately prevail." In did in China, as we know, and also in Vietnam, and appears to be succeeding in Iraq as well.

Both the Japanese, and now the US, seem covered by this quote from Mao's work:

The so-called theory that 'weapons decide everything' [is]
...onesided... Weapons are an important factor in war, but,
not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are de-
decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of
military and economic power, but also a contest of human
power and morale...

Wang Ming, again angling for power, rejected Mao's tactics. This split the PB down the middle. The issue was the defense of Wuhan from Japanese attack. Mao wanted to disperse to the countryside because he thought the city could not be held. Wang Ming wanted to hold the city and called on the population to defend it. However, the struggle between Wang and Mao would soon be over and Mao would be the winner. A Comintern statement in September 1938 settled the issue: "in order to resolve the problem of unifying the Party leadership, the [CPC] leadership should have Mao Zedong as its centre." It was signed by Dimitrov. Wuhan fell to the Japanese the next month.

The Sixth Plenum of the CPC was also held at this time. Mao gave several speeches, quoted by Short. The following are, I think, particularly interesting ideas that Mao put forth:

"[The] sinification of Marxism-- that is to say, making sure that its every manifestation has an indubitably Chinese character-- is a problem which the whole Party must understand and solve without delay." [The Party is still working on this one!]

"Every communist must grasp this truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' ... We are advocates of the abolition of war ... but war can only be abolished through war. In order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun."

Does that sound Orwellian? Or is it dialectics? Mao, Short says, understood the world by means of "reasoning by opposites, analysing the innate contradictions which, in his words, 'determine the life of all things and push their development forwards.'" Mao was also trying to reconcile Marxist dialectical thinking with some traditional forms of Chinese philosophy.

In November of 1938, due to increased attacks from the Japanese, Mao et al moved to the caves at Yangjialing some three miles to the north of Yan'an. It was at this time he also married the last of his wives-- Jiang Qing.

Over the next few years the struggle against the influence of Wang Ming intensified. This struggle became known as the Yan'an Rectification Campaign. This campaign was to inculcate the notion that Marxism must be adapted to Chinese reality, failure to do was labeled as "Subjectivism." "By the time it ended," Short says, "Mao would no longer be the first among equals. He would be the one man who decided all-- a demiurge, set on a pedestal, towering above his nominal colleagues, beyond institutional control."

This is a bit too much. No one is that powerful without the support of, and the ultimate possibility of, "institutional control." If Mao had too much power it speaks of the backward social conditions in China at the time, the lack of a democratic culture, and the difficulties of a two pronged attack on the Party coming from the GMD and the Japanese.[Similar conditions explain Stalin's power as well.] The CPC intrusted Mao with so much authority because his policies had proved to be correct where others claiming leadership had failed miserably. Short himself says that by 1941 under Mao's guidance the Party was prospering, while under the guidance of Wang Ming and his faction "it had come to the brink of destruction."

Mao also had the right idea in this 1941 campaign, i.e., to rectify subjectivism by fighting wrong ideas, not the people holding the ideas. That is, to fight the sin not the sinner. Mao was for "curing the sickness to save the patient" not "the harsh struggle and merciless blows" of the past. Good intentions, but not always lived up to.

Mao was against "book learning" Marxism. He stressed the importance of being able to read and practically apply Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. Reading Marxist books and reciting "every sentence from memory" of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin was worthless. Its too bad he didn't remember this before the Little Red Book was disseminated!

"We have some comrades who have a malady," he wrote, "namely that they take foreign countries as the centre and act like phonographs, mechanically swallowing whole foreign things and transporting them to China." This is still a problem. Many Maoist sects today do just this, mechanically applying the ideas of Mao, which were in large measure historically conditioned by time as well as place (i.e., mid 20th century China), to the problems of the world today. This also goes for Trots still living in 1917 Russia.

An important issue arises out of the Rectification Campaign. In the past the CPC had used fear and repression to make sure its line was adhered to. Mao realized that this was an incorrect policy for Marxists. As Short puts it, Mao adopted Confucius view of "the force of virtuous example" as the proper way to influence people to follow the party line. "The masses are the real heroes," Mao wrote.

This contrasted with Confucius who said the mass of the people "may be made to follow a course of action, but they may not be made to understand it." The dialectic between these two views explains a lot of the turmoil and violence ot revolutions.

"All correct leadership," Mao wrote, "is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses.' This means : take the ideas of the masses [raw, unfiltered?] [and] then through study, turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas, then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and ... test [their] correctness in action ."

Lenin thought that the ideals of socialism had to be imported into the masses from the outside. This agrees with Confucius. But he also thought the masses could understand them as well. Mao agrees with this ["through study", etc.]. Whence the Gulag? Either large segments of the masses have failed to understand and embrace the imported ideas (Stalin) or the party has failed to propagate and explain properly (Mao). But in practice both Mao and Stalin fell back on the "enemy agents and class enemies" explanation. This was the serpent in the garden of Marxism: only for Marxists the Fall was the result of not eating the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

The case of Wang Shiwei is instructive. The Rectification Campaign called for inner party debate to correct problems. Wang, all the evidence shows that he was loyal party member, wrote a satire about the privileges that party leaders had (better food, etc.,). This was a very popular essay,but the leadership didn't appreciate it. Wang ended up denounced as a GMD spy and he and his supporters imprisoned. Also 40,000 members were expelled from the party and thousands were tortured and made to confess that they were enemy agents. It was all a farce. Mao's theories may have been correct but the "people" turned out to mean "the leaders." This may be the fate of revolutions in historically underdeveloped regions.

Wang was an intellectual and there was a great deal of hatred towards his "class" among the leadership with a peasant background. Mao ordered no killing this time around (not wanting a repeat of the AB-tuan fiasco of 1930). Mao ordered that Wang not be freed and not be killed. He stayed in jail from 1942 until 1947. In 1947 the communists left Yan'an. Before they left the local leader, He Long, had Wang killed with an ax. Revolution is not a tea party.

History is so unpredictable. As Short points out, in 1943 Chiang Kai-shek brought out his book, "China's Destiny". The author, seeing himself as the true ruler of China, didn't have a chapter about his ending up only ruling Formosa (Taiwan.) The same year Stalin abolished the Comintern (to please his allies in W.W. II). This meant that the CPC was now an independent party. This year also gave birth to the term "Mao Zedong Thought" and to Mao's "Selected Works." Mao's personality cult was also growing, evidenced by the song "The East is Red":

The East is Red, the sun rises.
In China a Mao Zedong is born.
He seeks the people's happiness.
He is the people's Great Saviour.

It would have been impossible, I believe, while Lenin was alive, for such a song about the leader to have been circulated in the Soviet Union.

Short tells that by 1944 W.W.II was nearing its end-- Italy was out of it and Germany and Japan were in retreat before the Soviets and Americans respectively. On July 22 of that year "the first and last overt attempt (until the early 1970s) to establish official lines of communications with the Chinese communists took place." This when the "Dixie Mission" began with the landing of a US plane at Yan'an.

The purpose of the mission was to broker an agreement between the GMD and the CPC. The CPC was willing to cooperate and be moderate. Mao had already put forth the ideals for a "New Democracy" stating that the "immediate goal was nor Soviet-style communism, but a mixed economy." Mao even thought about dropping the word "communist" because he said, "it might be more appropriate to call ourselves a Democratic Party." This was because he thought that, as Short says, "the United States was 'the suitable country' to aid China's modernization."

Stalin, by the way, had earlier told the US that the Chinese were "margarine communists"-- a view he held as he doubted the CPC represented real communism and he doubted that Mao's views were "orthodox." Short says his opinions also "fitted well with his efforts to further a" peace accord between the GMD and CPC.

Meanwhile, at Yalta the US and the USSR decided China should be a "buffer" between their two spheres of influence-- the Pacific Ocean on the one hand, and North-East Asia on the other. This is what Short says, ( two "dominated" areas) but if China is a "buffer" what is left of "North-East Asia"-- just territory that is already part of the Soviet Union in the first place (plus Korea). So Stalin is really putting China as a "buffer" between the USSR and the growing American Pacific "Empire" which will be centered in Japan. The real point, however, is that the Dixie Mission was put into play because Stalin agreed not to give any aid to the CPC in its fight with the GMD. This was all before the USSR declared war on Japan.

The CPC agreed to try and work things out peacefully with the GMD, but Mao was skeptical about Chiang's real sincerity. He might have been taking Oliver Cromwell's advice: "Trust in God but keep your powder dry."

On August 9, 1945 the USSR declared war on Japan. Zhu De ordered all the Red Army forces to take the surrender of Japanese forces who tendered it. Chiang, however, demanded that the Japanese should only surrender to GMD forces. Mao and the CPC naturally called upon Stalin for some support against Chiang's position.

What happened next caught the CPC off guard. On the 15th of August, just a few hours before the surrender of Japan, Molotov and the GMD "signed a treaty of alliance." Stalin, Mao thought, not for the first time, had stabbed the CPC in the back with respect to the GMD. The CPC had been sold out, says Short, "for Russia's national interests." Those two A bombs on Japan may have had something to do with it.

By November the Civil War was waging again, due to the GMD's unquenchble desire to get rid of the CPC, and with US backing. Stalin was now worried about his relations with the US, Short says, and decided to try and make a good impression on Washington.

The Soviet Union now told the CPC it "must withdraw from all major cities and communications routes within a week." In north China where there was now a Russian military presence, Peng Zhen, the CPC leader in the area was told by a Russian commander, Short quotes him,"If you do not leave we will use tanks to drive you out." Communists that were trying to stop the advance of the GMD forces by sapping the rail lines were told they would be disarmed by the Russians if they did not stop. The Sino-Soviet split may have its origins a little earlier than the 1960s it seems.

Peng Zhen was furious: "The army of one Communist Party," he said, "using tanks to drive out the army of another? Things like this have never happened before." They would happen again-- most notably when the Chinese Army in the 1970s actually attacked the Vietnamese (and was repelled). Russian tanks were also used against the Hungarians and the Czechs. They who sow the wind shall reap the whirlwind. But this time there was nothing the CPC could do. They obeyed the Russians.

Mao was stuck. The USSR-Chiang Treaty blocked the war to overthrow the GMD while the GMD could still attack the CPC and left him trying to get approval for actions the Soviets did not want to support. What to do?

President Truman to the rescue! The US Congress did not want to get involved in a Chinese civil war and wanted Truman to withdraw. Congress had grit in those days and Presidents were concerned about following the Constitution. Truman's new policy was to halt the hostilities between the CPC and the GMD and to get the Soviets out of Manchuria (which they occupied after the Japanese surrender.)

Under US pressure a ceasefire between the GMD and CPC was signed on 1-10-1946. The Soviets had agreed to turn over their areas in Manchuria to the Chinese government's troops and Chiang called a political conference of all the Chinese parties to work out future policies. But things didn't go Chiang's way. The Communists, moderate GMD elements, and other liberal groups had a majority and Chiang lost control of the conference. The conference then proposed a coalition government with the CPC , in which the GMD could have no more than 50% of the ministers, and an elected national assembly. Hmmmm. Communists and Capitalists working together as equals for the good of the people. Not possible! One side has got to outflank the other.

Mao, however, was happy and said that "a new era of peace and democracy has arrived." He rebuked the comrades who doubted that oil and water could mix. Mao gave a banquet and toasted Truman for contributing to "Chinese-American friendship."

It is interesting to note how Mao appeared to an AP reporter who was present, John Roderick. Roderick thought Mao had "an air of self-confidence and authority just short of arrogance" and gave an impression of leadership "which must have emanated from men like Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Lenin." He forgot Caesar.

Meanwhile, Chiang had no intention of sharing power with the CPC. The Cold War had begun, Churchill had given his "Iron Curtain" rant in Fulton, Missouri and Chiang persuaded Truman that the GMD must expand its territory to prevent a Communist takeover. The GMD attacked and the civil war was on again.

By the spring of 1947 the GMD forces were closing in on Yan'an and Mao and his forces had to flee. But Mao wasn't worried. They could have Yan'an he said and then quoted Confucius (The Analects): " 'If a thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return, that is contrary to propriety.' We will give Chiang Yan'an. He will give us China."

from PAEditor's Blog

CULTURAL AMNESIA: ADAM BRESNICK ON CLIVE JAMES

by Thomas Riggins

Clive James' "Cultural Amnesia: Notes in the margin of my time" is 896 pages long and made up of 106 essays ranging over the cultural and historical debris of the 20th century. It is reviewed by Adam Bresnick in the TLS for 9-14-2007.

In a busy world with zillions of books should you invest your time in reading this gigantic tome? If the review is any indication of the contents of the book I would say both yes and no. It depends on your intellectual commitments. Clive is supposedly a "humanist" and opposes the hoary and meaningless abstraction of "totalitarianism." He appears, from the review, to be merely a conservative pro-imperialist intellectual snob. If you like that kind of writing this is the book for you.

You will learn that "Soviet communism and Nazi fascism are obverse sides of the same murderous coin." History doesn't appear to be one of James' strong points. He should read Isaac Deutscher's "Stalin" to find out the differences between a system dedicated to war, conquest and genocide and one that ended up brutal and backwards due to trying to improve the world without the material and moral means of doing so. The Catholic Church produced both St. Francis and Torquemada. The Soviet system produced its share of both but the Nazi's were Torquemada down the line.

James writes the following idiotic observation (based on reading cold war hacks such as Raymond Aron), "The liberal believes in the permanence of humanity's imperfection; he resigns himself to a regime in which the good will be the result of numberless actions, and never the result of conscious choice." So, I won't join the Society for the Abolition of Slavery because I would be making a conscious choice and should rather rely on the numberless actions, presumedly of "good" masters, to bring about some improvements in the imperfection of humanity. James may have a great "style" but he has a sponge for a brain.

Even Bresnick, who approves of the book and this way of thinking is forced to admit that "Jamie's literary and musical sensibility may be problematically conservative" [tastewise that is] and that sometimes he "gets carried away with himself [phrase making]" and also at times it is difficult "to take James seriously" (he seems not to have understood "Paradise Lost").

All in all this seems to be a book by a gifted stylist and intellectual narcissist
whose understanding of the world is warped by ruling class cold war ideology masquerading as a profound understanding of reality. Don't waste your time on this one.
from PA Editor's Blog

George Packer's "Planning for Defeat": An Analysis of a Plea for Occupation

By Thomas Riggins

The journalist George Packer has an article ("Planning for Defeat") about the situation in Iraq in the September 17, 2007 issue of The New Yorker. It is very informative, but unfortunately, veers from reportage into advocacy, and not just any advocacy, but advocacy of placing Iraq under semi-permanent military occupation by the US-- in fact making it an economic colony of American capitalism.

Additional information:
8 million Iraqis require emergency aid
About one-fourth of Iraqi children are malnourished
5 million Iraqis depend on the country's food rationing system; only 3 million have reliable access to it
3 to 4 million Iraqis are internally or internationally displaced
80% of Iraqis lack effective sanitation
70% lack sanitary water
50% unemployment
12,000 doctors have left Iraq due to the violence

--From United Nations, International Red Crescent, Oxfam, IRIN News, United for Peace and Justice

I relate some pertinent facts about the current situation in Iraq, from Packer's article, then present my justifications for the above conclusion. He tells us that Moqtada al-Sadr (the Mahdi Army , a fearsome and powerful Shia militia is loyal to him) is "perhaps the most important political figure" in the country. A most interesting observation considering that the US has spent four years fighting in Iraq, and spent billions of dollars trying to undermine him. At one time Bush and his generals even talked about "arresting" him. The dreams of a paper tiger!

Packer's article appeared before the Petraeus-Crocker farce was performed on Capitol hill (and for Fox news) last week. He reported that everyone concerned knew in advance what they were going to say, namely "military progress, a political stalemate among Iraqis, more time needed." He got that right.

Packer, who has been to Iraq, and whose New Yorker connections has given him access to the high and mighty, is in a position to tell us what the insider thinking is about Iraq, as opposed to the pabulum dished up in the mass popular media, And that is, with reference to the "military progress" that "the inadequacy of the surge is already clear, if one honestly assesses the daily lives of the Iraqis." The fact that the surge is being touted by Bush, the Republicans, most of the press, and of course Petraeus (the new Westmoreland) is because none of them ultimately give a hoot about the daily lives of the Iraqis.

And, as any freshman ROTC student could tell Petraeus, when an incompetent, but highly armed conventional army floods an area, the insurgency melts away only to return after the the invading troops have shot their wad. Thus, Packer writes, "The militias, which have become less conspicuous as they wait out the surge, are nevertheless growing in strength...."

The surge and heightened troop levels cannot be maintained. Special advisors to Gen. George Casey (Army chief of staff) have "estimated that the number of soldiers and marines who can be kept in Iraq into 2009 will be, at a maximum, a hundred and thirty thousand." That is pre-surge level. They will be facing, if what Packer said is correct about the growing power of the militias, an even more formidable insurgency that will emerge. Then, the boys playing soldier at the Pentagon will have even more problems.

Packer next discusses a report entitled "Phased Transition" put out by a think tank called the Center for a New American Security, which he calls "center-left." Only in America would this right wing pro-imperialist outfit be nominated "center-left."

It argues for a reduction of troops to 60,000 by 2009 and a "complete withdrawal by 2012. Thus not only would Iraq be the subject for next year's presidential election, but the next one after that as well. How long is Bush's albatross to be us?

The purpose of this timetable is to allow us to train the Iraqis to take care of themselves. This is an old refrain and we have already seen how likely it is that the comprador group we placed in power is likely to pull this off.

Packer talked to Colin Kahl who teaches "security studies" at Georgetown and helped write the report. "Kahl argued, President Bush needs to be forced to compromise now, or else the war will end in a precipitate, chaotic flight."

He then quotes Kahl directly, "If Bush keeps the pedal on the surge until the end of his Presidency, we will rocket off the cliff, and it guarantees that the next President will get elected on a pledge to get us out of Iraq now." But that is just what the left, and I would argue, everyone who has the real interests of the American people at heart and is not a shill for the big corporations, wants. Not a rocket off a cliff, but a pledge to get us out of Iraq now. Perhaps, however, rocketing off a cliff would be less costly in terms of human life and the erosion of our own values through this mindless warmongering of the Republicans and their allies than prolonging the agony of defeat another four years.

The President and his general are telling us that the surge is working, especially in Anbar province where the Sunnis are "working with us." But, Packer points out, "without a functioning state in Iraq, U.S. support of these Sunni forces could easily lead to renewed violence and warlordism."

That the Iraqi "state" is nonfunctioning, a joke really, was recently demonstrated when it attempted to expel the U.S. State Department''s murderous mercenary private army, Blackwater, from the country. One phone call from Condoleezza Rice put Prime Minister al-Malaki in his place and let him know who really runs the show in Iraq: Blackwater stays.

So, what are the options for solving the problems we have created for ourselves and the Iraqis by Bush's criminal intervention. Since Congress won't impeach him and turn him and his accomplices over to an international war crimes tribunal and then pay for the reconstruction of Iraq and compensate the Iraqi victims of this mass murderers assault upon them (the only just solution), some less satisfying resolution is necessary.

How about "partition"? This is Senator Biden's solution. He thinks he is playing Risk. "But," Packer reminds us, "the idea of partition can't be imposed by outsiders [sorry Senator] and, so far, has no support from Iraqis [except the Kurdish minority]."

There has been a positive development, from the secular point of view. That is that "Civil war and sectarian rule have tarnished the prestige of religious parties and increased the appeal of a nonsectarian government." One of the weaknesses of this article is the lack of any comprehensive discussion of the role of the labor movement, or the Communist Party and other secular forces (the women's movement for example) in the current struggle to rid the country of the illegal occupation.

But what if there is no good way to exit Iraq? What it the choice is either build up more troops and fight to the finish, or immediate withdrawal a la our flight from Saigon and the rest of Vietnam? Packer quotes Stephen Biddle (Council of Foreign Relations) who says all the step by step withdrawal plans involve a reduction of combat forces, but it is our forces that are protecting us and "capping violence around the country" so gradual withdrawal "means that the violence is only going to increase." This increase will fuel demands to just get out entirely. So why not just "do it sooner" and save all the lives that would be lost in the meantime. An excellent argument for an immediate withdrawal.

Packer also gives us the opinions of David Kilcullen who was an advisor on General Petraeus's staff. The issue for him is "What do we want Iraq to look like" once we are on the way out and finally gone. The question shows the problem of imperialism. It doesn't matter what we want. Its up to the Iraqis to do what they want.

As long as we are in the "we want" mode the killing will go on. Kilcullen also participated in a "strategic-assessment team" (these people have no idea what they are doing) that at least put the lie to Bush's version of what is going on in Iraq (democracy and freedom). The team decided that we should work, over the next two years, on attaining "sustainable security" but it also appears that most of the team "believed that it was too late to achieve this goal." Nice.

We must work for "core American interests" in Iraq. Kilcullen lists six which he gave to the State Department and White House. We are really in a bad way if they hadn't figured these out on their own. They are all either outrageous and/or ridiculous and are unattainable because of the war not attainable as a result of it. Here they are, with suitable comments of my own.

1. Keep the oil and gas flowing. The real purpose of the war-- to steal the
Iraqi oil, as even Greenspan now tacitly admits. It will flow after we leave.

2. No safe haven for Al Qaeda. The evidence is that Iraqis will get rid of Al
Qaeda on their own. Al Qaeda gets more powerful because we are in Iraq.

3. Contain Iranian influence. Forget it.

4. Prevent a Rwanda scale humanitarian catastrophe. He's got to be
Kidding. We have already caused a humanitarian catastrophe that
is greater that Rwanda.

5. Restore American credibility. Get out of Iraq, stop threatening Iran, and
put the screws on Israel until it makes an honest deal with the
Palestinians, gets out the West Bank, and returns the Golan Heights.
Otherwise, forget it.

At this point in his article Packer ceases to be a reporter and becomes an advocate for the failed imperialist policies of US monopoly capitalism. He also, if he really believes what he says, shows he has learned nothing about the causes and consequences of US policy.

"The notion," he writes, "that Iraq and the Middle East will be more stable without an American occupation, as the Center for American Progress claims, misunderstands the role that America has come to play in Iraq: as a brake on the violent forces let loose by the war."

Let me get this right. The US starts the war, it becomes violent, and the US is the brake to stop the violence. Mr. Packer should be a contestant on "Do You Know More than a Fifth Grader." But he better not take the Middle East as one of his subjects. This is the argument the Germans gave after taking over Poland and other areas of Europe. Gott in Himmel, we can't leave now, look at the violence that would breakout.

If we don't remain an occupier, Packer says, "Iraq's predatory neighbors will take advantage of the power vacuum to pursue their own interests." Well, all the neighbors have said, and it is objectively true, that their best interests would be a free, independent and stable Iraq free of a foreign occupation. The only predator is the US who has invaded and taken over (or is still trying to) a country in a, lets hope, vain attempt to control its oil and set up a government to its liking regardless of the interests and desires of the people.

It is incredible both that Packer can advocate for such a brazen criminal continuation of war and murder and that The New Yorker would give him the pages to do so.

Packer also says, "the burden of proof lies on anyone who claims that Iraqis without Americans around won't be substantially worse off and might even fare better." This simple minded attempt to shift "the burden of proof" away from the warmongers to the peace movement and the critics of Bush's folly won't stand up.

The millions of Iraqi dead and wounded, the displacement of millions more as both internal and external refugees, the destruction of the country's infrastructure, its medical and educational systems, the barbarous treatment of the civilian population by the occupation forces and its mercenary contingents, the attempts to privatize and loot its natural resources, the creation of sectarian violence, the murder of hundreds of thousands of its children, all this is the gift of the Americans and the continued occupation promises more of the same.

In the face of this The New Yorker has the cheek, and the moral insensitivity to publish an article that says that those who advocate peace and the cessation of war and occupation "have the burden of proof" that the Iraqi people would be better off without us. Well, just ask them. Every poll shows they want us gone, one way or the other gone, and they don't want to be occupied. There has never been an imperialist power that didn't think the "natives" were better off under its control than on their own.

Packer could care less for the Iraqi people. What is important is that "Iraq still matters to the United States, whoever is in the White House, and it will for years to come." The reason? Iraq sits "in the geographical heart of the Middle East, on top of all that oil"-- don't forget that OIL (we want it desperately-- it should be ours). Oh yes, there is "radicalism" too. Where does that come from? Could people be radical because we occupy their country? Let's occupy their country to prevent radicalism.

Packer knows all of this by the way. But national (corporate) interest will out. "Whenever," he writes, "this country decides that the bloody experience in Iraq requires the departure of American troops, complete disengagement [Iraqis be damned!] will be neither desirable nor possible [!]. We might want to be rid of Iraq, but Iraq won't let it happened." Not as long as it is "on top of all that oil."

CAN PROGRESSIVES SUPPORT OBAMA?

Thomas Riggins

Unless Obama changes his position on Iraq, I think the answer is, at present, No! This is why I think so.

The New York Times reports (9-13-07) that while Obama wants to withdraw COMBAT brigades by the end of 2008 he wants to leave some forces behind "to strike at terrorists, train Iraqi soldiers and protect American interests."

But to strike at terrorists will require leaving combat troops in Iraq so this is really not a withdrawal but merely a troop reduction and a continued occupation disguised as a withdrawal.

We all know what "protect American interests" means. It means protect the imperialist corporate interests of the major war industries that are making super profits out of the occupation and the oil interests who want to privatize as much as possible of the Iraqi reserves (the much ballyhooed new oil law benchmark pushed by Bush AND the congress).

"What's at stake," Obama says, "is bigger than this war: its our global leadership." Is this not a confession that the goal of US imperial hegemony is part of Obama's outlook?

Its true that according to recent polls 56% of the American public agree with Obama and that only 20% favor complete withdrawal. Its also true that Obama would be better than any likely Republican as president. But progressives cannot, I believe, support continued occupation of Iraq, nor a program based on protecting the interests of US imperialism in the region. A program that can only lead to more and bigger disasters for the American people in the long run.

Obama supporters should struggle with him to improve his position on an Iraqi withdrawal. In the meantime, I think progressives, at this time, should be supporting the Kucinich campaign as a educational pressure tool to move the front runners to the left.

We should also be supportive, on the issue of Iraq, with the position of Gov. Bill Richardson who favors complete withdrawal and said, with respect to Obama's position, "Leaving behind tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for an indefinite amount of time is nothing new. [Obama's] plan is inadequate and does not end the war."

Finally, I think my position is more consistent than not with the following quote from the Iraqi Communist Party:

"A national consensus is emerging in Iraq, among the major political forces, that there should be a clearly defined objective timetable for a speedy withdrawal of the occupying forces, linked to rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces. Up to now, Bush has adamantly refused to be committed to such a timetable, obviously preferring an open-ended military presence and occupation. While an immediate withdrawal is widely seen by Iraqis as not feasible, it is increasingly not acceptable to have an open-ended foreign military presence, especially with the evident responsibility of the Americans for certain aspects of the deteriorating security situation."

Based on this, it might be a feasible position for Obama to call for the UN to take over the training of the Iraqi forces and for all (except for Marine guards at the embassy) US troops to be out of Iraq as soon as possible on a timetable proposed by the Iraqi government and the progressive people's forces represented by the CPI and its allies. While this would be a great advance for Obama, the slogan of the US peace movement should remain "Out Now!"
from PAEditor'sBlog

ROGER COHEN AND THE DISQUIET OF GEN. CHIARELLI

by Thomas Riggins

Monday's New York Times (9/10/07) has an interesting op ed piece by Roger Cohen ("A U.S. General's Disquiet.") The general in question is Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli who is presently the Def Sec's (Robert Gates) senior military advisor. Cohen's piece is about an upcoming article in the journal Military Review by the general. (along with Maj. Steven Smith.) Let's see if we can figure out the reasons for his disquiet from the information provided by Cohen.

Here are some quotes Cohen has taken from the general's article. "Much of our government and interagency seem to be in a state of denial about the requirements needed to adapt to modern warfare." This would imply that we are not ready to engage in such warfare and that Iraq is a big mistake

The view Chiarelli descries is "that all we have to do to win our modern wars is kill and capture enough of the enemy." This seems to be the view of Bush and his advisors as all their emphasis is on battling the "enemy" and trying to impose order through force. Chiarelli knows, however, that modern warfare requires much more than just the fighting aspects. There are hearts and minds to be won over as well.

"If," he says, "we are unable to do a better job than our enemies of influencing the world's perception, then even the most brilliant campaign plan will be unlikely to succeed." But the world's perception will be based on our actions as they really are not on issuing better press releases than our "enemies." For example, if there is little support for our mission in Iraq in the perception of the world, it is because none of the reason's we have given to explain why we are there make any sense. How can we do a better job of influencing the world's perception, when that perception is probably already correct?

The general also thinks that the U.S. has been damaged by, Cohen says, "some military leaders and service members" who, Chiarelli writes, "have not internalized the moral and ethical codes that define who we are as an armed force and nation." More than the military is involved here. The use of torture, the invasion of Iraq (a war of choice), the mass killing of women and children by our forces, etc., was thought up and put into motion by the civilians in the Bush administration. The military just implemented what Bush and Cheney and their gang told it to do. As for abstractions such as ethical and moral codes, they really only exist in the actions and behavior of human beings. What you see is what you get. The U.S. military's morality is Abu Ghraib, just as it is Bush's morality as well.

The general is right when he says such actions damage "our credibility as a fighting force, our mission and indeed our standing in the world." But what can be done about it. We are our actions. The general says, "Too often, we are reluctant to admit mistakes." Again, it is a mistake to think of these foul moral actions as "mistakes" rather than the inner essence of war itself and of the American military, or any military, that wages a war of aggression and invasion of another country. This was, after all, a war of choice and is in itself a moral obscenity. There is no way to change that perception.

Chiarelli's disquiet is also seen in the following. "The U.S." he writes, "as a nation -- and indeed most of the U.S. government-- has not gone to war since 9/11. ... the American people and most of the other institutions of national power have largely gone about their business." This is because most people know that this war has nothing to do with 9/11. The events of 9/11 were cynically manipulated to justify the invasion and war in Iraq which had already been decided upon by the Bush followers. This war is not for the American people, nor is it in their interests. They know it and that is why the military is fighting alone and the nation is shopping, or as Cohen puts it, "maxing out credit cards." Its a good sign the American people are not behind the military, except pro forma, because it means the people still have a sense of the moral imperatives the military and the Bushites have clearly lost.

He understands what is at stake. "Our current problems raise the legitimate question of whether the U.S., or any democracy [with two probably stolen back to back presidential elections!] can successfully prosecute an extended war without a true national commitment." I think it cannot. The war in Iraq will be lost because it does not deserve to have such a commitment. It is an unjust and illegal war, certainly it is an immoral one. The U.S. military should not be the plaything of a president who uses it for his own corrupt motives and if it becomes such a plaything it should not be surprised to see the American people distancing itself from it. The military is not completely at fault. Congress failed in its duty to make the president stand down, and it failed to prevent his highjacking of the military for his own purposes. But generals such as Chiarelli also failed to speak up and, by working for Robert Gates rather than for the men and women of the armed forces, have failed in their moral duty to the nation.

THE DAWKINS DELUSION AND ANTHONY KENNY (with a Marxist coda)

by Thomas Riggins

There is an interesting review by the British philosopher Anthony Kenny in the August 17, 2007 issue of TLS: "Reason to believe". It is a review of a book by atheist turned Christian Alister McGrath and his wife Joanna Collicutt McGrath. The book is "The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist fundamentalism and the denial of the divine." This a very small book, only 98 pages.

The McGraths take exception to Dawkins's recent book "The God Delusion." Kenny points out, as have others, that Dawkins's book "has a strident and aggressive tone." Dawkins also thinks "that religion is the root of all evil." This is an idealist position which ignores the role of social and historical circumstances in the development of religions and confuses secondary causative factors with primary.

The McGraths don't understand why Dawkins is so hostile to religion, so Kenny gives them two reasons to consider. First the rise of Christian fundamentalism in the US "which endangers" the teaching of science. Kenny could have added it also endangers any progressive transformation of modern industrial society with its war mongering ultra patriotic jingoism and its manipulation by the ultra right neoFascist forces associated with the military-industrial-congressinal complex which dominates political power in the US.

Second is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism "which has spawned extremist groups willing to murder thousands of innocent people...." The McGraths, however, think this is besides the point. They decry fundamentalism, but think Dawkins too is a fundamentalist-- an atheist one.

But it seems to me ridiculous to compare Dawkins's militant atheism to the kind of beliefs that lead people to blow up medical clinics providing abortions or to suicide bombers. They claim, according to Kenny, that "atheism as well as religion has given rise to massacres, and true religion, as exemplified by Jesus of Nazareth, is hostile to violence. Kenny thinks "These points are fairly taken."

Lets not give away the store here! " True religion" is no better exemplified by "Jesus of Nazareth" than by any other religious leader. Nor was Jesus hostile to violence. Just read John 2:13-17 where he makes himself a scourge (whip) and drives perfectly law abiding merchants and business people out of the Temple-- overturning tables, seizing other people's money and dumping it on the floor, etc. This is not the action of someone hostile to violence. And don't forget Matthew 11:34ff, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword." His so called followers have certainly spent a great deal of their time wielding the sword.

Interestingly enough, Kenny thinks Dawkins to be stronger in just the area the McGraths find him weakest. This is in the McGraths, or at least Mr. McGraths's own area of specialization-- i.e., historical theology. Kenny says Dawkins is often more accurate in his interpretations than is McGrath. He gives some examples which indicate that Dawkins's view of Christianity is more in accord with historical orthodoxy than McGrath's. McGrath seems to have a liberal academic version of the faith that would be unrecognizable to the vast majority of Christians.

McGrath claims, according to Kenny, that Dawkins fails to distinguish between religion and belief in God. Buddhists are religious but don't believe in God, Evangelicals believe in God but their behavior is not religious (!). It appears that crazy fanatical behavior is not religious by definition.

Kenny says that the real distinction should be between belief in God and faith (accepting a particular revelation.) Dawkins's real target, according to Kenny, is people who accept a creed. Kenny quotes Dawkins as follows:

What is really pernicious is the practice of teaching children that faith itself is a virtue
Faith is an evil precisely because it requires no justification and brooks no argument.
... Suicide bombers do what they do because they really believe what they are
taught in their religious schools: that duty to God exceeds all other priorities, and
that martyrdom in his service will be rewarded in the gardens of Paradise.

McGrath objects to this definition of faith, but it is a feeble objection. Kenny again thinks Dawkins is closer to the real historical workings of faith than McGrath's views. As far as God is concerned, Kenny agrees with the McGraths's rejection of the principal argument Dawkins gives against the existence of God.

I think it does appear to be dumb argument. It goes like this. Humans are exceedingly complex and it was very improbable that they would develop. God is even more complex so it is even more improbable that It should exist. The question, however, the McGraths say, isn't if God is probable or not, but is he actual.

Since there is no proof either way, the theist and the atheist are in the same boat, according to Kenny, and so the appropriate stance is that of agnosticism. Kenny also agrees with the McGraths that Dawkins has done more harm to science than religion. He justifies this by saying:

Most people have a greater intellectual and emotional investment in religion
than in science, and if they are once convinced that they have to choose
between religion and science and cannot have both, it will be science that
they will renounce.

Marxists don't think people should be put in the position of having to make such a choice. Since they believe that it is an alienated social reality that gives sustenance to religious beliefs, they maintain that if the social question is answered religion as we know it, the great creedal (and warring) faiths, will die out much as the paganism of ancient Greece and Rome has died out in Protestant countries.

Thomas Riggins is the book review editor of Political Affairs and can be reached at pabooks@politicalaffairs.net